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Faith, Fact, and Behaviorism
J. E. R. Staddon
David Hume argued that ought cannot be derived from is. That is, no set of facts, no amount of
scientific knowledge, is by itself sufficient to urge us to action. Yet generations of well-meaning
scientists (more and more as secular influences grow in the West) seem to have forgotten Hume’s
words of wisdom. All motivated action depends ultimately on beliefs that cannot be proved by
the methods of science, that is, on faith.
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Kurt Go¨del was a buddy of Albert
Einstein when they were both at the
Institute of Advanced Study at
Princeton in the 1940s. But his fame
began with his answer to David
Hilbert’s question in 1928: ‘‘Is it
possible to prove everything in math-
ematics?’’ Go¨del showed that the
answer is ‘‘no.’’ The dream of Russell
and Whitehead in their ambitious
three-volume Principia Mathematica
(1912 to 1927) was that all of
mathematics could be reduced to a
single, complete logical system.
Go¨del showed their dream was
doomed to fail.
So, even in mathematics, the most
certain knowledge we have, there will
be statements whose truth cannot be
proved. It should come as no sur-
prise, therefore, that in the field of
human action, the same is true. There
are rules in which we all believe that
have no provable basis.
This will not shock most people.
To know how to behave in the
myriad situations of everyday life,
we must all follow rules that we take
on trust. What is good and bad?
What is decent or improper, polite or
impolite? A few rules are accepted by
almost everyone: don’t kill or steal,
be honest, even love one another. But
others, like praying five times a day
or wearing a yarmulke, are less
obviously useful. A handful of opti-
mists may secretly think that al-
though they don’t know the details,
all, or at least most, of these rules and
conventions have been, or potentially
could be, proved to be correct, shown
to conduce to the common good in
some way. But most people just
accept that there are rules and don’t
worry much about where the rules
come from or why they should follow
them.
The provability of rules of conduct
would not be much of an issue except
that in recent years the philosophy of
scientific naturalism has gained
ground among the intelligentsia both
in the US and, especially, the UK and
Europe (e.g., the New York Times
debate between Timothy Williamson
and Alex Rosenberg; Rosenberg,
2011; Williamson, 2011). Scientific
naturalism is the idea that science is
all there is, so that if something
cannot be proved by the methods of
science, it has no meaning. It is a
variety of logical positivism that the
studious among you will recognize by
its claim that there are only two kinds
of true statements: tautologies, like
logic and mathematics, and empiri-
cally verifiable claims of science. All
else is nonsense. But if even mathe-
matics contains unverifiable claims,
as Go¨del showed, is it likely that
other forms of knowledge will fare
any better?
Scientific naturalism is sometimes
called scientism, but then its practi-
tioners would naturally be scientists.
Some possibility for confusion there!
It is better labeled scientific imperial-
ism (Staddon, 2004). It is imperialistic
The Behavior Analyst bhan-36-02-05.3d 4/9/13 17:07:00 229 Cust # TBA-5
Please address correspondence to John
Staddon, Department of Psychology and
Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham,
North Carolina 27708 (e-mail: jers@duke.
edu).
The Behavior Analyst 2013, 36, 229–238 No. 2 (Fall)
229
because it claims that there is nothing
else but science. Ought is just the
same as is, and is is the realm of
empirical fact:
If the empiricist world view is correct, ought is
just shorthand for one kind of factual
statement, a word that denotes what society
first chose (or was coerced) to do, and then
codified. … Ought is the product of a material
process.
So wrote famed biologist E. O.
Wilson in 1998 (p. 251). In a 2009
interview (Junod, 2009), he expanded
on the same theme:
One by one, the great questions of philosophy,
including ‘‘Who are we?’’ and ‘‘Where did we
come from?’’ are being answered to different
degrees of solidity. So gradually, science is
simply taking over the big questions created
by philosophy. Philosophy consists largely of
the history of failed models of the brain.
Wilson is pretty sure that science will
eventually take care of all the philo-
sophical questions that are worth
asking, moral questions included.
His approach leaves little room for
ambiguity. After all, if morality is just
a matter of facts and there is only one
world, the moral universe should be
as stable as the physical one.
B. F. Skinner was less forthright
that Wilson. But he also betrayed no
hint of doubt about what’s good:
‘‘To confuse and delay the improve-
ment of cultural practices by quib-
bling about the word improve is itself
not a useful practice’’ (Skinner, 1961,
p. 6). He knew what improve is; he
knew, in other words, what is wrong.
He doesn’t tell us the details, perhaps
because he assumes that we know
too. And for the most part, he was
correct—about his intended audi-
ence, at the time he wrote.
In other places, as Hocutt (2009)
has pointed out, Skinner identifies the
good and the right with whatever is
reinforcing or whatever is reinforced
by society (see also Staddon, 2001).
Like Wilson, all is eventually traced
to evolution; ‘‘Things are good (pos-
itively reinforcing) or bad (negatively
reinforcing) presumably because of
the contingencies of survival under
which the species evolved’’ (Skinner,
1971, p. 104). More on these issues in
a moment.
But undoubtedly the best known
and most thoroughgoing scientific
imperialist is Oxford evolutionist
Richard Dawkins (1997, 2006). He
is especially hard on faith, that is to
say belief in something that cannot be
proved by the methods of science:
I think a case can be made that faith is one of
the world’s great evils, comparable to the
smallpox virus but harder to eradicate. …
Faith, being belief that isn’t based on evi-
dence, is the principal vice of any religion.
(1997)
Come on Richard, don’t sugarcoat it!
Readers attentive to logic will
notice that this is a very odd state-
ment. Dawkins is declaring his faith
in the evils of faith.Never mind. He is
in fact a pretty moral sort of chap,
and he advocates science as a sort of
morality. Indeed, he is often accused
of being a believer in science as a kind
of religion. In partial agreement, he
responded in this same address: ‘‘Sci-
ence is actually one of the most moral,
one of the most honest disciplines
around—because science would com-
pletely collapse if it weren’t for a
scrupulous adherence to honesty in
the reporting of evidence.’’ Most of us
would agree, but let us see whether
this claim refutes Hume’s argument
that science (facts) alone give no guide
to action. Is science moral, and if so,
on what is its morality based? Is
science a sort of religion?
THE INGREDIENTS OF
RELIGION AND THE ROLE
OF SCIENCE
All religions have three types of
ingredient, although the relative em-
phasis differs from one religion to
another. Buddhism goes very light on
the supernatural, for example.
The first category is the supernat-
ural, a belief in invisible or hidden
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beings, worlds, and processes (e.g.,
miracles, reincarnation, and the
soul). All these are unverifiable, or
unseen and unseeable, except by
mystics under special and usually
unrepeatable conditions. The philos-
opher and mathematician Bertrand
Russell, an earlier model for Dawkins
in many respects, somewhere paro-
died the supernatural thus: ‘‘When
men drink too much they see snakes,
when they eat too little they see
visions.’’ Because absence of evidence
is not, logically, evidence of absence,
these features of religion, neither true
nor false, but simply unprovable, are
all outside science.
The second category is morality:
All religions have a code, a set of
moral and behavioral prescriptions,
usually said to flow from God, that
provide guides to action in a wide
range of situations. The Ten Com-
mandments, the principles of Sharia,
the Five Precepts of Buddhism are
examples. More on these in a mo-
ment.
The third category is natural:
Every religion, especially in its pri-
mordial version, makes claims that
are essentially scientific; assertions of
fact that are potentially verifiable.
These claims are of two kinds. The
first we might call timeless (e.g.,
claims about physical properties; the
four elementary humors, the Hindu
turtle that supports the world, prop-
erties of foods, the doctrine of literal
transubstantiation). The second are
claims about history (e.g., Noah’s
flood, the age of the earth, the
resurrection, all myths of origin).
Wilson is clearly right about time-
less claims. When a religion makes
always true statements that are po-
tentially verifiable (e.g., the sun
moves round the earth), it must
confront the scientific account and
will usually lose to the methods of
science.
About historical claims, there can
be more argument. Direct observa-
tion is impossible, experiments can-
not be done, and the historical record
is often sketchy. Was there a Noah’s
flood (or at least a real historical
event that can be identified with the
story)? Did Jesus convert water into
wine at one point in time? Don’t
know, can’t know.
On the other hand, the evidence is
overwhelming that Irish Archbishop
James Ussher (1581–1656) was wrong
in thinking that the earth was created
on the night preceding Sunday, Oc-
tober 23, 4004 BC of the Julian
calendar. Physical, geological, and
astronomical evidence all concur.
The age of the earth is about 4.5
billion years and of the universe some
13 billion. Once again, science wins.
As for the first category, because
supernatural claims are unverifiable
by scientific means, they fall outside
the realm of science. Is there no God,
one God or many Gods? If one, is
Mohammed or Jesus his representa-
tive? No experiment can decide these
issues. It is in this respect that science
and religion form nonoverlapping
magisteria, in the late S. J. Gould’s
(1997) rather pompous phrase.
So Category 1 is clearly outside
science and Category 3 is inside. In
Category 1, there is no contest
because there is no objective way to
decide on the truth of a supernatural
claim. In Category 3, claims about
the natural world will almost always
be decided by science.
What about Category 2? What is
the status of morality, the rules that
guide us in everyday life? Dawkins
says that science is moral: What can
he mean by that, and is the morality
provided by science an adequate
guide, or is something more needed?
And if so, where should that come
from?
Science depends on a belief in an
external reality that obeys fixed laws.
This fundamental assumption is in-
deed a matter of faith in the sense
that it cannot be proved or dis-
proved. No matter how many laws
we discover, there is no way to prove
that they will not spontaneously
change tomorrow. Induction (it
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worked yesterday and today, so it
must work tomorrow) is not proof, as
Hume (1740) also pointed out. But
without this assumption of a stable
universe, scientific activity would
have no point. Perhaps this is why
Dawkins exempts it from his general
condemnation of faith. Dawkins also
seems to have faith in the virtues of
honesty, which is also essential to
science as a social activity.
These two unprovable beliefs (in a
stable nature and the value of hones-
ty) rest on a third: the value of
science. Unless we value science, we
can be indifferent to beliefs that make
it possible. But why should we care
whether science is valuable or not?
Science by itself provides no reason.
Belief in the value of science is by
no means self-evident. The historian
William Dalrymple tells the story of
an early 19th century Indian Mughal
who received a microscope as a gift.
Instead of amazement and interest
at the wonders it revealed, he was
appalled by so much novelty and
disposed of the instrument as soon as
he could. Science has been blocked or
prohibited in many cultures in the
past. Even today, it is unlikely that
basic research on, say, psychobiology
or political science, would get much
support in Iran or Saudi Arabia. We
‘‘know’’ these folk are wrong and we
are right, but how do we know? It is a
matter of our faith versus theirs.
Hume was right. Facts ( science) by
themselves provide no ought, they
urge no particular action. If science is
to provide guidance, to facts must be
added some values: ideas about good
and bad. But where do these values
come from? And why has this point
been repeatedly missed, or at least
evaded, by so many eminent atheists?
Well, now we are in the realm of
psychology. I am not sure, but I
suspect that for most people, atheists
included, notions of what is right and
wrong are pretty automatic. No
reflection is required. Dawkins, Wil-
son, and the rest all know what they
believe, hence they see no reason to
inquire further as to the sources of
their beliefs.
The problem is that there is little
consistency of belief from one place
or culture to the next. Accepted
beliefs also change with time. Here
is an example, a set of beliefs that
were generally accepted by the bien
pensants less than a century ago but
are now almost universally reviled:
Its supporters included Theodore Roosevelt,
Woodrow Wilson, and Winston Churchill. It
was approved by Supreme Court justices
Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis,
who ruled in its favor. The famous names who
supported it included Alexander Graham Bell;
… activist Margaret Sanger; botanist Luther
Burbank; Leland Stanford, founder of Stan-
ford University; the novelist H. G. Wells; the
playwright George Bernard Shaw; and hun-
dreds of others. Nobel Prize winners gave
support. Research was backed by the Carnegie
and Rockefeller Foundations. The Cold
Spring Harbor Institute was built to carry
out this research, but important work was also
done at Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Stanford
and Johns Hopkins. Legislation to address the
crisis was passed in states from New York to
California. … These efforts had the support of
the National Academy of Sciences, the Amer-
ican Medical Association, and the National
Research Council. … Those who opposed the
theory were shouted down and called reac-
tionary, blind to reality, or just plain ignorant.
(Crichton, 2004, pp. 723–724)
Other fans at various times were
Nobelist Linus Pauling, Winston
Churchill, Maynard Keynes, and
vegetarian dog-lover Adolf Hitler.
What was this widely accepted scien-
tific theory? The theory was of course
eugenics, and it wasn’t just science; it
also came with a moral imperative:
the importance of ‘‘improving the
race.’’
Like any scientific theory offered
as a reason for action, eugenics has
two parts. The science: Selective
breeding works as well with humans
as it has with dogs, cats, and goldfish.
True. And the faith: The human race
needs to be improved. And we know
what’s wrong and how to fix it. True?
Maybe for some, but not for others.
Belief in the ‘‘faith’’ part of this
theory impelled the state to actions
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like compulsory sterilization, which
are now utterly deplored by the very
same class that years ago embraced
them. The North Carolina Eugenics
Board (one among many in several
states), which oversaw enforced ster-
ilization of criminals and the mental-
ly ill, remained in operation until
1977. But the laws that authorized it
were not repealed until 2003 (Eugen-
ics Board of North Carolina, n.d.).
We’re not talking ancient history
here.
Eugenics fell out of fashion after
the Nazi example, and B. F. Skinner
took no position on it, as far as I can
tell. But its supporters were as
unthinking as he appears to be in
the earlier quote. They also might
well have said, ‘‘To confuse and delay
the improvement of [the race] … by
quibbling about the word improve
is … not … useful.’’
There are of course rational argu-
ments for eugenic measures like
sterilizing people who are not capable
of looking after their own children.
There are similar arguments not just
for the death penalty but also for
extending it to mentally incompetent
murderers. After all, we do not
scruple to euthanize mad dogs, even
if they were once beloved pets. Why
should a psychopathic killer be
spared even as his ‘‘sane’’ counterpart
is executed? Yet received opinion in
America nowadays is opposed to all
these ideas. Why? There is no ratio-
nal or scientific answer. Again, belief
for or against eugenic measures
depends not only on the evidence
for eugenic science, but also on which
values dominate (personal responsi-
bility and freedom vs. the supposed
good of the race; these are matters
not of science but of faith.
So, people, even scientists (even
Richard Dawkins) have faith, beliefs
that cannot be derived from science
or even, in many cases, from any
kind of rational argument at all.
Where do these beliefs come from?
How might we understand them
scientifically? And what should we
believe? Let us look at each of these
questions.
From a scientific point of view, our
values and beliefs must originate in
our personal history and the history
of our ancestors. Human archeology
is coy about details of the belief
systems and social arrangements of
our forebears. The intermingling
of nature and nurture during each
human lifetime is almost equally
obscure. Consequently, we can only
speculate about the selective forces,
individual and group, that have led to
the array of human belief systems
across the planet. Nevertheless, a few
generalizations can be made.
Diversity
Just as human physiognomy shows
quite wide variation, it is likely that
human belief systems will also vary
from culture to culture. More than
50 years ago, linguist Noam
Chomsky (1957) proposed that a
single universal grammar underlies
the vast range of different human
languages. The idea hasn’t died, but
we’re still looking. I doubt, personal-
ly, whether any comparable axiom-
atic core of values can be found from
which the astonishing variety of
human moral systems can be derived.
But the possibility cannot yet be
ruled out.
Antagonism Between Individual and
Group Selection
Group selection has long been a
controversial idea, but recent debates
allow it as an increasingly important
process (Eldakar & Wilson, 2011).
Group selection of course favors
altruistic behavior such as helping
others, willingness to die in fights
with other groups, and so on. Indi-
vidual selection favors selfishness.
Campbell (e.g., 1956, 1975) pointed
out this tension many years ago.
Usually, people act in their own
interests. But there is no doubt that
people sometimes act in the interests
of others, even to their own detriment.
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Relatives are the usual beneficiaries
of altruism, but not always: War
fighters, risking their lives for their
country, their tribe, or their religi-
ous group, are the most striking
exception.
Utility (Cultural Fitness)
Of the many unprovable beliefs
that define a culture, some aid its
survival and some impair it. In
hindsight, these beliefs can sometimes
be identified. We may guess that
relatively free speech and openness
to new ideas permitted the growth of
science and technology, both essen-
tial to the success of Western culture
in recent centuries. (Historian Niall
Ferguson, 2011, calls these ideas
‘‘killer apps.’’) The philoprogenitive-
ness of the Church of Latter Day
Saints (the Mormons) has undoubt-
edly aided its growth. Conversely,
the universal celibacy of the United
Society of Believers in Christ’s Sec-
ond Appearing (the Shakers) ensured
its swift demise. (The church could
grow only through conversion, which
was made more difficult by the
commandment that made it neces-
sary.) In these simple cases, the link
between success or failure and the
belief in question is pretty obvious.
But for most beliefs, their contri-
bution to cultural survival is obscure
because the future is largely un-
known. Choosing beliefs on the basis
of their contribution to cultural
fitness implies that we can predict
the future trajectory of our civiliza-
tion. But the fact is that, despite Karl
Marx and a few others, the future
course of a civilization cannot be
reliably predicted: ‘‘Marx may be
excused for holding the mistaken
belief that there is a ‘natural law of
historical development’; for some of
the best scientists of his time believed
in the possibility of discovering a law
of evolution. But there can be no
empirical ‘law of evolution.’’’ So
wrote Marx’s great critic Karl Popper
(1950, p. 665). It is hard to prove a
negative, but I am inclined to agree
with Popper. Deciding just which
beliefs favor cultural survival (even
supposing that all desire such a thing)
will always be problematic.
But we can try. Unfortunately, the
results are not encouraging, because
the most obvious culture-favoring
beliefs contradict many contempo-
rary values. For example, what about
the rights of homosexuals or women?
Does toleration (or even embrace)
of homosexuality help or hinder the
production of children? Surely sub-
ordination of women to the realm of
kinder, ku¨che, und kirche (or Sharia
and the burka) will aid reproduction
and thus enhance the growth of the
civilization that supports these be-
liefs? After all, the rate of annual
population growth of the Jewish
population of Israel stood at 1.5%
in 2005, while the rate of growth of
the Muslim population was twice as
much (Basok, 2006). But which
group holds values closer to, say,
those of the Harvard campus, views
that many educated Westerners ac-
cept unquestioningly?
Which brings us back to eugenics,
once embraced and now condemned.
Or is it really condemned? Eugenics
seems to be making a comeback in
the form of designer babies: ‘‘Homo
sapiens, the first truly free species, is
about to decommission natural selec-
tion, the force that made us. … Soon
we must look deep within ourselves
and decide what we wish to become.’’
So said Wilson in a recent interview
with media scientist Michio Kaku
(2011, p. 137). We have given up the
idea of messing with other people’s
Darwinian fitness, but Wilson gives
us free rein to tinker with our own.
Great idea? All on board?
Recent votes are increasingly open-
ing the door to gay marriage. If
marriage is to be liberalized, why
not also legalize polygamy, the orig-
inal eugenics policy? As far as we can
tell, many if not most early societies
were polygamous, at least far as their
rulers were concerned:
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The anthropological record indicates that
more than 85 per cent of human societies
have permitted men to have more than one
wife (polygynous marriage), and both empir-
ical and evolutionary considerations suggest
that large absolute differences in wealth
should favour more polygynous marriages.
(Henrich, Boyd, & Richerson, 2012, p. 000; )
In a polygamous society, the evolu-
tionarily more fit males gain more
wives and hence more reproductive
power. It is their genes that fill the
pool, not those of the faithful mo-
nogamists. Perhaps polygamy made
us what we are? Who could argue
with that!
These conundrums show just how
little we understand what will be
good for us in the long run. Even
something as obviously beneficial as
our obsession with health, for exam-
ple, has its potential downside. I
remember some years ago in India
talking to our host Hamid about the
rather casual attitude to safety and
hygiene common in rural Rajasthan.
He was unworried. ‘‘We raise our
children to be strong,’’ he said. ‘‘We
lose a few, I suppose. But when they
grow up they don’t show all the
allergies and weaknesses of Western
children.’’ Tough love indeed! But
perhaps effective in the long run?
Some recent scientific work seems
to support Hamid. Too-strenuous
efforts to protect our children from
disease may contribute to autoim-
mune ailments in later life:
Your great-grandparents faced infectious dis-
eases that hardly threaten you today: tuber-
culosis, polio, cholera, malaria, yellow fever,
measles, mumps, rubella, smallpox, typhoid,
typhus, tapeworm, hookworm. … But there’s
also a long list of modern illnesses that your
great-grandparents barely knew: asthma, ec-
zema, hay fever, food allergies, Crohn’s
disease, diabetes, multiple sclerosis, rheuma-
toid arthritis. The coincidence of the rise in
these ‘‘inflammation’’ diseases, characterized
by an overactive immune system, with the
decline of infection is almost certainly not a
coincidence. (Ridley, 2012, p. 000< )
Maybe Western nations are too
hygienic, or at least too obsessed
with health? The original Surgeon
General’s Report (http://profiles.nlm.
nih.gov/ps/access/NNBBMQ.pdf) on
smoking shows that heavy smokers
over age 80 have a lower death rate
than nonsmokers. This is unlikely to
reflect the beneficial effects of ciga-
rettes. More likely, it is the result of
selection: Only the most resistant
smokers survive to that age. On the
other hand, smokers tend to die
around retirement age, saving the
rest of us health and pension costs
with little or no loss of contribution
to the GDP (Sloan, Ostermann, Con-
over, Picone, & Taylor, 2011; Stad-
don, in press). Should we therefore
quit vaccinating, encourage smoking,
and abolish crash helmets for tod-
dlers on tricycles? Probably not, but
who knows?
Do most of our current beliefs help
or hinder our culture? The predictive
problem can sometimes be solved.
Occasionally, like the Shakers’ belief
in universal celibacy, even the dim-
mest of wits can see that a belief can
be self-destroying. (The Shakers died
out. Who could have guessed?!) But
even if the predictive problem is
solved (unlikely, but possible), the
philosophical problem remains: To
base everything on evolutionary suc-
cess, you have to believe that survival
(of yourself, your relatives, and your
culture) is an absolute good. Not
everyone does. Like any matter of
faith, this also cannot be proved by
reason. There is a small subset of the
environmental movement, for exam-
ple, that seems to think that human-
ity is a blight on the planet and the
cosmos would be better off if we just
went extinct. Facts don’t prove them
wrong.
Because evolution (history) is an
inherently unpredictable process, we
don’t know which of our unprovable
beliefs will turn out to be essential to
cultural survival. But it seems as if
several obvious guesses about the
most culturally fit policies contradict
a number of our most deeply held
beliefs. So what’s wrong: our beliefs,
our guesses, or the premise that
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cultural survival is the absolute good?
You choose.
Reinforcement
Bertrand Russell points out that
we may do as we please but may not
please as we please. In behaviorist
jargon, what he is referring to is the
fact that the things that reinforce us
are more or less fixed during ontog-
eny, whereas the means we can use to
achieve them are quite flexible. Op-
erant behavior is when we do as we
please, but for the most part what
pleases is set by human nature.
This is a great simplification, of
course. Fashion (in clothing, art, and
even science) provides an ever-chang-
ing set of reinforcers that are prod-
ucts of the social environment (see,
e.g., Staddon, 2012, Chapter 3). Why
have mechanical watches, which are
more expensive to make and main-
tain and less accurate than the quartz
variety, come back into to fashion to
the point that some cost more than
a luxury automobile? Why will the
British pay thousands of pounds for
an apparently undistinguished car
number plate (e.g., 36KC was recent-
ly on offer for £24,000)? Why can art
that is sometimes mistaken for trash
by the cleaning lady be sold for
thousands of dollars? Wealth awaits
the savant who can figure out how
fashion works! If the good is just
‘‘what is reinforcing,’’ as Skinner
often claimed, we are faced with an
embarrassment of riches!
If we accept, as I think most now
do, that all adaptation, both ontoge-
netic and phylogenetic, is the out-
come of a process of variation and
selection (see Staddon, 2010, for a
review), then (many? most?) reinforc-
ers are largely the product of selection
during phylogeny. But because we are
a smart, social species, our reinforcers
are many; not just the basics of food,
water, and sex. The actions we use to
attain these reinforcers are the prod-
uct of selection (operant condition-
ing) during ontogeny. For example,
we tend to accept the beliefs of our
own group, even if they seem patently
absurd to outsiders. Conformity is
reinforced. Why? Probably because
groups that cohered in this way won
ancient battles.
War
Deadly conflict is relatively rare in
recent times. This is a well-document-
ed fact that will surprise most people
given two world wars and the geno-
cidal social engineering of totalitarian
regimes across the world during the
past century. But population in-
creased even more than violent death
in the 20th century. Both war and
murder have declined as a propor-
tion. In Europe, for example, your
chance of dying a violent death is
between one 10th and one 50th
(depending on the country) what it
would have been 500 years ago
(Pinker, 2012). But internecine con-
flict was very common during prehis-
tory (see Pinker’s discussion of fo-
rensic archeology and ethnographic
statistics for the data). Ancient times
therefore offered much opportunity
for the selection of behavior aiding
the group. It is no accident that all
cultures reward the families of fallen
warriors, preserving as best they can
the gene pool of self-sacrifice. Noto-
riously, Saddam Hussein of Iraq,
when he was in a position to do so,
offered a $25,000 reward to the
families of Palestinian suicide bomb-
ers (‘‘Saddam Pays 25K for Palesti-
nian Bombers,’’ 2002). It looks now
as if altruism moved out beyond the
family in part because of its virtues in
intergroup conflict. Not ‘‘make love,
not war’’ but ‘‘war makes love’’!
So much for the origin and prob-
able scientific basis for our beliefs.
But accounts at this level are pro-
foundly unsatisfying to most people,
for Hume’s reason. Just because we
can understand the causes of a belief
does not make that belief right. It
doesn’t provide a reason for us to
believe. Description is not the same
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as prescription. This is where reli-
gion comes in. Religion is important
because it strengthens belief in the
unprovable. The syllogism runs like
this:
Success of a culture depends on some beliefs
that are unprovable.
A belief is more effective the more strongly it
is held.
Religions strengthen the beliefs they embody.
Ergo, religious belief will sometimes aid the
success of a culture.
In other words, religious belief, con-
demned by the likes of Russell and
Dawkins, may sometimes help a
culture to succeed in competition
against others. But does this give us
a reason to believe in the tenets of
any religion? Maybe.
Why is religion so effective, at least
for many people, in strengthening the
beliefs it embodies? Now we are back
to psychology and phylogenetic and
cultural selection for group cohesive-
ness. Atheists will probably agree
that monotheism is surely related to
our long childhood and the impor-
tance of the family. Everyone needs a
father, although fewer and fewer
have one around these days in the
U.S. (Murray, 2012); hence ‘‘God the
Father.’’ There seems to be some-
thing about evolved human nature
that makes a right, for example, more
compelling and less alterable if it is
said to ‘‘come from God’’ rather than
from the political process. Placing the
source of rules in some other place
just works for a lot of people. And, as
I just pointed out, a spiritual source
can’t be questioned or disproved,
which is another advantage!
CONCLUSION
The facts and logic of science,
unaided by values, provide no basis
for action. There must be a motive,
some notion of good and bad, some
kind of faith, to urge us to act.
Because action is necessary for sur-
vival, faith (belief that is unprovable
by science) is essential. Hence the
dogmatic atheist’s condemnation of
all faith amounts to a sort solipsism:
logically impeccable, but senseless in
practice. And as I have shown, even
themost committed atheist has faith in
something.What distinguishes atheists
is not their lack of faith but their
unwillingness to examine it.
What faith should we follow? Rea-
son can help in resolving conflicts and
in finding the best means to attain our
ends. But the ends must come from
somewhere else: religion (i.e., God,
Allah, etc.), other people, individual
eccentricity, ‘‘conditioning,’’ evolu-
tionary success, or whatever.
Why should we believe in any-
thing? Because belief is essential to
action, and action is essential to
survival. Not much guidance there,
but no support for ‘‘no faith,’’ either.
So, listen to arguments, examine your
beliefs, but then believe!
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